A Historiography of the “Hitler Myth”

Understanding how and why the German people became enthralled by fascism is vital to better understanding people’s allure to authoritarianism. There are many who have undergone the challenge of investigating Hitler’s rise to power; for example, in Hitler’s Willing Executioners, Daniel Jonah Goldhagen claims that Hitler rose to power because the German people were waiting for an excuse to attack the Jews; conversely, Christopher Browning argues that the German people were fulfilling their obligations out of peer pressure and commitment to one another in his book Ordinary Men. In this same tradition, Ian Kershaw investigated the “Hitler Myth,” while in Backing Hitler: Consent and Coercion in Nazi Germany, Robert Gellately explored the objective realities of how Hitler enchanted the German people by delivering results through “law and order” and harsh oppression of what he deemed to be “asocials.” In both cases, whether the people were deceived independently or by the masterful Nazi propaganda machine, both Kershaw and Gellately came to similar conclusions. For those skeptical of Kershaw and Gellately’s discoveries, there are countless eyewitnesses that have testified to the author’s discoveries. Lili Armstrong, Robert Fisch, and Herman Cohn are but three such examples.

In The ‘Hitler Myth:’ Image and Reality in the Third Reich, Ian Kershaw illustrates the creation of a German folk “Hero” and his vision to save Germany from the oppressive Western Allied powers who wronged them via The Treaty of Versailles. Kershaw explains the fact that even though Germany was a democratic nation; that ideology goes beyond political party. In the case of the Nazis, the ideology was that the German institutions and Democracy itself had failed the German people. In other words, people that were not a part of the Nazi party still empathized with the Nazi ideals. Conservative elites gambled on Hitler and his charisma as useful tools to defuse opposition, unite the people, and reorient Germany’s influence globally. (Kershaw, 1). In Robert Gellately’s book, Backing Hitler: Consent and Coercion in Nazi Germany, Gellately reveals that Hitler had greater ideas for Germany than he originally proposed. When describing Hitler, Gellately writes, “None of this distracted his attention from ambitious plans, and only days after his appointment he was already talking to military leaders about how he wanted to end the ‘cancer of democracy’, to install the ‘tightest authoritarian state leadership’, and even to embark on the ‘conquest of new living space in the east and its ruthless Germanization’” (Gellately, 21). From Kershaw, Hitler was erected to be a great mythical “hero” for the German people and with that “hero” status, Gellately reveals Hitler’s more sinister vision for the Third Reich. While the people of Germany were euphoric from the Nazis’ successes, Hitler wanted to seize as much power as he could to create a dictatorship to see his dreams become reality. (Gellately, 21).

It is well known what the consequences were for the Jewish people during the Nazi regime and such an outcome would imply that antisemitism was the cornerstone of Nazism. However, both Gellately and Kershaw explain that was not exactly the case. “Antisemitism was initially soft-pedaled, not only because depriving the Jews of making a living would hurt the economic recovery, but as I show in the book, also because most Germans in 1933 did not feel as strongly and as negatively about the Jews as did Hitler and the Nazis. Therefore, the first targets were not the Jews, but individuals and groups long regarded as threats to the social order (like the Communists) or to the moral universe, like criminals, ‘asocials’, and other ‘problem cases’” (Gellately, 25-6). Through this lens, it is clear that Hitler was targeting “asocials” and the people supported his persecution of marginalized groups. It is more accurate to see the Jews as one such group. While it is true that they were the predominant group and Hitler clearly set plans for their destruction even before his election in his book, Mein Kampf, his personal aspirations would have to wait. The economy and the support of the German people had to come first. Like Gellately, Kershaw explains that the role of antisemitism was largely misunderstood in the early years of Hitler’s regime. Hitler would identify the ills of German society and blame them on various groups, low birth rates, liberalism, homosexuality, the developmentally disabled, immigrants, and of course, the Jews. The people were largely antisemitic, so when Hitler spouted antisemitic rhetoric, the people saw that as truth-telling. Since the people recognized him as the truth-teller, that would lead them to believe that the opposition was lying to them. (Kershaw, 2).

The German people were fearful of the prospect of another war. In the early years, Hitler revitalized Germany without going to war, which served to build morale and support for the Nazi party. Hitler used pageantry as a spectacle to entice the German people. In Lili Armstrong’s testimony for the Shoah Foundation, Armstrong describes the night when Hitler became Reich Chancellor, she says that there was a huge “torch march” through the streets of Berlin at night. Despite being one of the “asocials,” Armstrong conveys that the pageantry was mesmerizing, and she admits that at the time she thought, “I wish I could be one of them.” (Armstrong). Displays like the one that Armstrong testifies, became a regular occurrence in the Third Reich. Parades boosted morale and gave the people something to cheer for. Herman Cohn explains his experience as quite different from Lili Armstrong’s, Frisch describes a day that he attended a parade and bore witness to Hitler’s charisma in one of his speeches. Cohn confesses that he initially refused to salute but after being coerced he did it out of fear. Cohn described the perception that the German people had of Hitler as “an angel from heaven came down the street. They were all that way.” (Cohn). With Cohn’s example, it becomes clear that Nazism was a “bottom-up” movement and that the people carried out Hitler’s wishes without instruction, and that “asocials” like the Jews, were met with hostility without direct orders from the Führer. Gellately dispels the ill-conceived notion that Hitler came to power and used terror to force the German people into submission, he writes, “By and large, terror was not needed to force the majority or even significant minorities into line. By mid-1933, or the end of that year at the latest, power was already secured, and the brutalities and violence that are identified with the so-called Nazi ‘seizure of power’, began to wane. Terror itself does not adequately explain how the Third Reich came to be, nor account for its considerable staying power” (Gellately, 22-3).

Rather than self-imposed terror, the fear of a potential war plagued the average German citizen. For that reason, when it came time to go to war, the people were not surprised. In many ways, they had mentally prepared themselves for what seemed to be inevitable. Kershaw focuses on the propaganda, both state-sponsored and self-imposed as to what the German people thought of Hitler. Through this mythical perspective, we can better understand the cult-like reverence that people had for their “Hero” or “Savior.” (Kershaw, 2). Hitler and the Nazi propagandists took particular care to ensure that Hitler maintained a “heroic” image. Hitler was more than a political figure; he was a unifying symbol for most German citizens or what would be known as the volksgemeinschaft. While this symbol of unification brought prosperity to some, the Nazis, and their corrupt government, used identity politics to destroy others. (Kershaw, 3). Hitler exploited one of the flaws within a democracy: majority rule. In modern terms, one might say that he “catered to his base.”

The Nazi party used the “Hitler Myth” to deter people from their self-interests. It was a tool to empower the government and separate people from Communist and Socialist ideologies. Leftist politics focused on the betterment of the people while Nazism focused on the betterment of the State. The differences are important because the natural response from the Great Depression and the humiliation of Germany from the conditions forced upon them in the Versailles Treaty would have been a focus on unemployment/labor, food, housing, and other necessities, the German people were swayed to forfeit their personal needs for the State (Gellately, 38). By consolidating the German resources, the Nazis were able to rebound from the Depression brought on to them by the consequences of WWI at the cost of individual freedoms. The Nazis and the German elite recognized that the “Hitler myth” was a tool needed to boost German morale and productivity. It was both expedient and effective. Kershaw reveals the following:

Towards the end of 1941, at the height of Nazi power and domination in Europe, Goebbels claimed the creation of the ‘Führer myth’ as his greatest propaganda achievement. He had some justification for his claim, and we will indeed be partially preoccupied in subsequent chapters with examining the ‘Hitler myth’ as an achievement of ‘image-building’ by masters of the new techniques of propaganda. However, it has been rightly pointed out that the ‘heroic’ Hitler image was ‘as much an image created by the masses as it was imposed on them.’

(Kershaw, 4).

From this vantage point, one may be inclined to believe that Hitler enchanted all of Germany, however, that was far from the truth. Most people did not support Hitler or the Nazi party, but through their merit and propaganda, the Nazis swayed even the naysayers. Over time, opponents of the Nazi party became true believers in National Socialism and its ability to deliver expedient results. The effectiveness and expedience were welcomed compared to the ineffective gridlock seen in the days of the liberal governments of the Weimar Republic. Hitler’s vagary in his rhetoric allowed him to separate himself from the actions of his supporters. Institutions like the Church were unable to pin atrocities like the “Night of the Long Knives” on Hitler because he never directly told anyone to do anything. The political executions came from a ground-up/grassroots movement. Hitler’s successes gave him an allowance with the German people to create and enforce otherwise unwanted policies. These policies were seen as necessary evils for the Nazi success machine to continue. (Kershaw, 5). Like Kershaw, Gellately conveys the same point; the people saw democracy as an ineffective form of government, and they pointed to the Weimar Republic as a failed example of liberalism. “Hitler conveyed a sense of the strong leader who was in charge, and after the years of upheaval that marked the Weimar Republic, the German state took on an aura of ‘normality’ that harked back to the days prior to World War I. Weimar was identified with the lost war, humiliating peace, economic turmoil, and social chaos, and had been loved by almost no one in Germany. This attempt to establish democracy did not sink deep social roots, and it became relatively easy for people to turn away from it” (Gellately, 21).

Kershaw derives a considerable amount of his research from literature produced by the SPD and the Sopade. While it is true that such sources hold a certain bias, they are more reliable than most. Finding unbiased resources when discussing Nazism is difficult. Kershaw explains, “Even if the reported comments faithfully reflect public attitudes, these attitudes may, of course, be themselves the expression of a more or less coerced conformity rather than of Hitler’s genuine popularity. In the nature of things, it is more difficult to interpret the pro-regime comments of the reports, where scepticism about the underlying elements of fear and coercion is bound to prevail, than it is to evaluate the anti-regime comments’ and actions of the population, which often speak for themselves” (Kershaw, 7). Due to such coercion whether self-imposed or not, the documentation that was produced by the Nazi government and its citizens is riddled with propaganda and overt bias. For that reason, Kershaw defends his usage of Leftist (oppositional) material. “A potential danger, therefore, is an overestimation of oppositional attitudes and a corresponding playing-down of genuine approval and consensus. Given the type of material at our disposal, there is no objective or external criterion for solving this difficulty. However imperfect, the historian’s judgment, based on patient source criticism, acquaintance with the complete mass of material available from different reporting agencies, and a readiness to read between the lines has to suffice” (Kershaw,7). Kershaw explains that the Sopade reports are more credible than other sources because they were unreliable. The Nazis actively obfuscated the facts deliberately.

When navigating the waters of the perception of Hitler, the man vs the mythical hero, one thing is certain, Hitler exuded a charisma that left the German people mesmerized. Robert Frisch warns viewers in his testimony that thinking that Hitler was a “madman” is a mistake, he says, “It is a great underestimation of his importance and his abilities. I think he was definitely a genius. What he used his genius for is another issue.” Frisch goes on to discuss that Hitler promoted the “Volks radio” or Volksempfänger, to further his influence by making his speeches more accessible to the people (Frisch). Clearly, such influence would not have been possible without consent granted by charisma and the results of prosperity. The ‘Hitler Myth:’ Image and Reality in the Third Reich, effectively shows that Hitler’s charisma and popularity were indispensable for the Nazis to garner such powerful influence. Without such support, Nazism would not have been so effective at producing rapid culture-shifting policies that reshaped the German political landscape. “’Heroic’ leadership was a significant element in the ideas of the ‘Heroic’ nationalist and völkisch Right long before Hitler’s spectacular rise to prominence. It can justifiably be regarded as ‘one of the central ideas of the anti-democratic movement in the Weimar Republic’ and ‘one of its indispensable articles of faith’” (Kershaw, 13). Moreover, The Germans saw Liberalism as a negative influence. Their history with authoritarian strongmen served them well with the “Iron Chancellor” Otto von Bismarck. Bismarck unified the German people and created the nation, setting it on track to be a world power. In contrast, the German experiments with liberalism brought them Jewish emancipation, which was seen as a negative to the majority, the removal of the Kaiser, humiliation, and destitution. The German people longed for a new mythical Strong Man that could solve all their problems. In their search, with a little help through propaganda, they found Hitler. Hitler found success with the German people by exploiting their resentment of the Western powers and liberalism, which gave him the license to invoke authoritarian policies with the promise of Lebensraum and prosperity. (Kershaw, 122).

The self-diluted Germans, accepted their “Hero” and his successes because as Kershaw writes, “The fear of another war was a constant, open or subliminal, accompaniment to the national euphoria which greeted Hitler’s triumphs, and it placed certain limits on the rejoicing” (Kershaw, 123). In short, the Germans were elated with their success, and they were waiting for the other shoe to drop. Hitler proved his effectiveness in the March 1936 election campaign by delivering results without forcing the German people into war. The success that he and the Nazi party delivered gave them permission from the electorate to continue restructuring the German constitution because people recognized the Nazis as a force for good. (Kershaw, 123).

Over time, Hitler’s inflated ego and unquestionable authority gave him the confidence to act like the “Hero” that the people believed him to be. That led him to ignore the Wehrmacht and the various elites that were supposed to keep him in check. His “Hero” status propelled him beyond their control and enabled him to conduct his true motivation, the elimination of the Jewish people. Like Hitler’s other successes, Hitler proved to the German people that he was a military strategist through the success of his early campaigns. These victories bolstered the “Heroic” image of Hitler and fed what Kershaw correctly calls, the “Führer cult,” however, over time, the “Führer myth” would be exposed, because objective reality is stronger than the wanting German desire to be led by a fictional “Hero.” (Kershaw, 147).

Bibliography

Gellately, Robert. Backing Hitler: Consent and coercion in Nazi Germany. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2013.

Kershaw, Ian. The “Hitler Myth:” Image and Reality in the Third Reich. Oxford, NY: Oxford University Press, 2001.

USC Shoah Foundation. “Armstrong Lili 38594 05 V01 5000000002382995.” YouTube, November 10, 2011. https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=jhmNdod0qE0.

USC Shoah Foundation. “Cohn Herman 24163 03 V01 5000000002310288.” YouTube, November 16, 2011. https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=62s1OYYfc2M&t=2s.

USC Shoah Foundation. “Fisch Robert 14292 02 V01 5000000002265314.” YouTube, November 15, 2011. https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=xcxFSugqpVk.